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ABSTRACT
The issues discussed in this paper are those related to the
introduction of program and policy change in the U.S. bilateral
development assistance system. The creation of the Institute for
Scientific and Technological Cooperation has focused attention on
transferring science and technology and satisfying basic human needs
-- two related but sometimes conflicting U.S. foreign assistance
policies. Because scientific and technological cooperation has in the
past been directed primarily toward industrialized economies and
because basic human needs satisfaction is directed to the elimination
of poverty but its means and ends are not clearly defined, the plan
proposed for ISTC suffers from contradictions and omissions that will
make it difficult to implement.
In addition, managing the implementation of the change within the
assistance system itself, while attending the aformentioned goal
conflicts, posies problems for the administrators of the new institute.
The implementation of change in the U.S. bilateral assistance system
consonant with cooperation and human needs goals requires an educational
intervention strategy. A matrix management system is also recommended
to address the complex management problems raised by the ISTC proposal.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Focus of Paper
This paper describes the organizational issues that are likely to
arise from the proposed creation of the Institute for Scientific and
Technological Cooperation (ISTC).
The issues are described in terms of the presumed behavioral
dynamics and processes accompanying change in large organizational systems.
The change results from a major reorganization of the United States
bilateral development assistance system currently being implemented. The
reorganization directly affects the relationships of ISTC with the
Agency for International Development (AID) and its sub-unit, the
Development Support Bureau (DSB). Moreover, a new coordinating agency,
the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), has been created
by the same reorganizational stroke.
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The policy implications of meeting the basic human needs of the
poor in developing countries, and the desire to share North American
technological expertise in the pursuit of development objectives provide
the background for this discussion. The theoretical framework upon
which the projection of likely scenarios is made is derived from the
issues surrounding technological cooperation with LDCs, the basic needs
approach and the management of organizational change.
Background
The 96th U.S. Congress, 1st Session, 1979, adopted the legislative
goal of strengthening the scientific and technological capacity of
developing countries' research and development (R&D) institutions. This
effort is considered a supplement to existing foreign assistance programs
conducted by AID, the multilateral banks and other institutions receiving
Federal funding. The vehicle for meeting the goal is the new ISTC.
The Institute is a unit of the International Development Cooperation
Agency. IDCA has the authority to coordinate the entire U.S. foreign
The name,"Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, has been
changed twice, once by the Administration from "Foundation for International
Technological Cooperation" to "Institute for Technological Cooperation"
and once by the House Foreign Affairs Committee which added the word
"scientific" to rename it the "Institute for Scientific and Technological
Cooperation." An Administration -prepared set of questions and answers
for the House Appropriations Debate maintains that neither change in name
represents a change in concept nor purpose. Given that science, or basic
research, is the assumed undergrid of technology, the assertion may be
correct. However, in that basic research and technological research are
two distinct activities, the range of Institute activities has been
expanded by the addition of the word "scientific." For further discussion
of this distinction and the implications for ISTC, see Section 3.0.
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assistance program heretofore managed through several federal agencies
and committees. In response to Congressional initiative spearheaded by
the late Senator Hubert Humphrey , President Jimmy Carter created IDCA --
a single agency with primary responsibility for coordinating all activities
related to U.S. sponsored international development programs. This
decision was made with the expectation that IDCA would improve development
1
assistance by making more coherent economic policies and programs.
U.S. scientific and technological expertise has been considered a
key component in meeting the basic human needs of the poor in developing
countries. The underlying belief is that appropriate applications of
technology can contribute towards increasing the productive capacity of
LDC economies and therefore raise the standard of living of the poorest
sectors. ISTC is considered an important step in this direction by
planners in the Administration.
The concern for growth with equity has been on the agenda of the
Administration's foreign aid policy, at least on paper. During the
hearings on the fiscal year 1980 foreign aid budget before the House
Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee,
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated that the first objective of foreign
assistance programs is "to help nations achieve self-sustaining, equitable
growth, primarily through a strategy of meeting basic human needs... Also
important," Mr. Vance continued, "is our support of technological progress
2
and improvement of basic infrastructure in developing countries."
The Problem
The Institute is a new agency within a new structure. Nearly half of
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the proposed 141 ISTC staff positions will transfer from AID. These
shifts tend to create tensions and conflicts among the coalitions
affected by the change process. ISTC managers will need skills that
enable them to resolve the organizational issues created by (a) the
reorganization itself; (b) the requirements of basic human needs policy
directives; and (c) the constraints involved in seeking technological
cooperation with developing countries.
Scope of the Paper
Management science provides the theoretical framework for
understanding the effects of change on a large, complex system. (Beckhard,
1977; Weisbord, 1976; Tichy, 1977.) The ISTC mission is considered in
terms of its stated goals. Etzioni (1975) defines goals as "desired
future states of affairs." The organizational issues are described from
inferences made about the outcomes of proposed strategies ISTC is expected
to follow. All the information used in this paper about the IDCA system
is derived from public documents, official statements of Administration
planners, interviews with AID officials and members of the ISTC Planning
Office. Also consulted on the issues addressed were staff members of
Congressional Committees, private consultants and researchers from the
Library of Congress. The Congressional Research Service prepared a report
3
on the issues of coordinating foreign aid which is used in this paper.
The principal objective of this paper is to present the issues
raised by the aformentioned constraints and policy directives. Under-
standing the dynamics and processes may help planners implement the
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policy and program goals more effectively and efficiently. Recognizing
that no single approach can adequately resolve such a complex set of
problems, an intervention strategy is recommended as a means of dealing
with the human resistance that often accompanies organizational change.
Format
The issues paper format is designed to present the reasearch findings
to the reader with a holistic understanding of the problems encountered
in organizing anew from established conditions. Its purpose is to
identify the most important organizational problems, clarify the proposed
basic objectives of ISTC and suggest the application of matrix management
techniques and team building as a strategy that is consonant with the
basic human needs approach to development.
The paper is organized into five sections. Section 1.0 contains
introductory remarks. Section 2.0 provides the framework for understanding
the implications of basic human needs policy on organizational change.
Section 3.0 describes the components that operate in seeking technological
cooperation with developing countries and the issues raised. Section 4.0
describes the organizational issues which must be managed by ISTC leaders
in the implementation of its mission. Section 5.0 concludes the discussion
and recommends a proposal for an intervention strategy aimed at improving
the implementation process.
-9-
NOTES
SECTION 1.0
1. Statement of Hon. John J. Gilligan, AID Administrator before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations
Committee (March 6, 1979), p.30.
2. House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Part IV.
3. See "Issue and Options In the Coordination of U.S. Foreign Policy"
prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division,
Congressional Research Service (May 1979).
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No equation can divine the quality of life,
no instrument record,
no computer conceive it.
Only bit by bit can feeling men
lovingly retrieve it.
Jerome B. Wiesner
2.0 BASIC HUMAN NEEDS POLICY
Introduction
The United States Congress mandated through the International
Development Cooperation Act of 1978 that bilateral development
assistance and U.S. contributions to multilateral organizations.
"emphasize programs in support of countries which pursue develop-
ment strategies designed to meet basic human needs and achieve
self-sustaining growth with equity." The 1979 amendments to the
Act require that IDCA and ISTC pursue similar objectives in
implementing their respective programs.
The purpose of the Institue is to focus "increased scientific
and technological research attention" on ways to meet basic human
needs (BHN) as well as "approach global problems" in developing
countries. The BHN policy mandate and ISTC's purpose become a
potential source of conflict in programming and implementing the
Act's policy. One reason is that BHN goals are poorly or variously
defined in terms of consistent operational applications within the
complex climate of development. Another factor is that technological
- 11 -
cooperation with the developing world has not been a proven vehicle
for meeting the basic needs of the poor. Traditionally, technology
transfers have served the interest of the more developed sectors in
the LDC economies. This section will refer to U.S. funded development
programs affecting countries in the low and middle income category,
but excludes the applications to capital surplus oil exporting
nations and centrally planned economies which are utraffected by
U.S. aid programs or basic needs initiatives.
The following discussion is centered on the economic and
social implications of basic human needs policy as it affects the
organization for technological and scientific cooperation with
developing nations. The setting is the U.S. bilateral development
assistance system and specifically ISTC. Congressional decisions
on appropriations affecting ISTC plans after January 31, 1980 are
not considered in this discussion, i.e., appropriating sufficient
funds to enable ISTC to begin its programs.
The role of institutions in developing countries in deter-
mining what basic needs will be met first and how is a critical
issue in planning the direction of ISTC programs. No less important
are the interrelationships of a basic human needs policy strategem,
the content of the scientific and technological cooperation program
and each participating country's development agenda. These inter-
relationships pose organizational problems for IDCA and ISTC and
- 12 -
create peculiar organizational issues. These issues are the subject
matter described in this and subsequent sections of the paper.
Purpose and Scope
This section suggests an operational definition of the Basic
Human Needs approach and describes the impact of this approach on
*
conventional foreign aid policies. Some BHN approaches to develop-
ment are more inclusive than others. They mesh better with conven-
tional economic development strategies, but are not likely to achieve
more equitable income distribution over the long term. Some
approaches are more sensitive to the cultural concerns of developing
countries. The operational definition proposed is a combination
of the best aspects of a number of approaches and is one which seems
most feasible to implement under the ISTC program guidelines.
The current interpretations of the BHN approach offered by
development institutions and IDCA in particular are described in
*
Accepted terminology is helpful in constructing an operational
definition. The second edition of Webster's New World Dictionary
defines policy as a "principle, plan, or course of action, as
pursued by government, organization or individual, etc. . ." A
strategy refers to "a stratagem-i.e., a trick or scheme for
achieving some purpose, or artful means to an end." An approach is
'an approximation or similarity . . . a drawing nearer" to something.
An appropriate term and the one that more closely reflects usage
among international institutions is "basic needs approach." This
paper will refer to the "basic needs approach" when plans or programs
for achieving the goals of meeting basic human needs are discussed.
It will refer to "BHN policy" when the subject of discussion is the
Congressional mandate or goal of U.S. foreign assistance.
- 13 -
subsection 2.1. This description is followed by subsection 2.2, which
examines the relationships between BHN policy and economic development
strategies, both those of the international development agencies
and those of developing country governments as ascertained from
collective development statements at international fora. The final
section, 2.3, summarizes the recommended approach for ISTC, given
the Institute's emphasis on technology and science as tools for
carrying out the BHN policy goals.
2.1 INTERPRETING THE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS APPROACH
The meaning behind the goal of meeting the "basic human
needs" of a population often gives rise to confusion among develop-
ment practitioners. The term lends itself to various interpreta-
tions. Strictly speaking, the term "basic human need" refers to
the essential, fundamental or elementary lack of something useful,
required or expressly desired by the populace. Common use among
the professional development community has expanded the meaning
of the term to include both physical and psychological requirements.
The basic needs generally considered as lacking in poor communities
are a minimum protein-calorie adequate diet (food); health main-
tenance of the less advantaged population (health); basic education
comprised of functional literacy (education); and adequate shelter
(housing). The absence of adequate levels of these basic requirements
significantly jeopardizes human welfare.
- 14 -
From these four general categories several ramifications are
possible. For example, marketing agricultural products to feed the
population requires secondary roads into inaccessible rural areas.
Hence, road construction can be considered as a basic need because
access to markets make it possible for the poor living in a remote
village to sell more of their crops. Yet, by conventional criteria,
providing infrastructure such as roads is not directly benefiting
the poor. As can be appreciated, this ambiguity can create policy
conflicts and operational problems in deciding the kinds of programs
that should be funded under the BHN guidelines.
The priority of basic human needs in approaches to develop-
ment has been conceptually arrived at by both Western and Eastern
values. United Nations statements on the content of the core
basket of basic needs reflects a universal view embraced by many
nations and peoples. The distinction between U.S. funded programs
guided by BHN concepts and other donor nations would likely reflect
the situational imperative and conceivably reflect different
values and political considerations.
2.11 The International View of BHN
International organizations have included the basic needs
concept in several declarations of intent. The most notable in
this respect is the Cocoyoc Declaration (1974) inspired by the
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). The Declaration
addresses the effects of international development patterns on the
environment and natural resources. With respect to basic human
needs, the Declaration calls for a redefinition of the "whole
purpose of development, stressing that people have certain
essential needs for food, shelter, clothing, health and education
which must be satisfied by public investment. Any growth process
that does not lead to the fulfillment of these needs is "a travesty
of the idea of development. Development, however, is not seen
as limited to meeting the physical basic needs.
Psychological needs can be regarded as freedom of expression,
freedom of the press and the fundamental right to receive and give
stimulus to ideas. From these notions emerges the Administration's
stand on supporting basic human rights.
Encouraging popular participation in the decision affecting
the functions of society is another component of BHN. Included in
this idea is the right to gainful employment, which takes on the
characteristic of an inviolate right. Without providing employment
opportunities, national cohesion cannot be achieved, since the gap
between a full employment economy and a resource poor economy will
tend to widen. According to the Declaration, a person enjoys the
right not to be alienated by the production process while pursuing
personal welfare that in essence narrows the gap. The Declaration
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further supports an international system which endorses the concept
of self-reliance of a people in their economic, social and political
development.
The World Employment Conference (1976), sponsored by the
International Labor Office, placed basic needs as the dominant theme
of development programs. The fundamental principle expressed at
the Conference was that "strategies and national development plans
should include as a priority objective the promotion of employment
and the satisfaction of the basic needs of each country's popula-
tion."4
Developing countries have sought to achieve independence from
the industrialized economies by using arguments consistent with the
basic needs approach. These arguments call for an "autonomous
5
self-sustained growth" that is presently ruled out by economic
dependence.
A parallel to the BHN approach is the New International
Economic Order (NIEO), which recommends a restructuring of the
world economy in ways that LDC human and material resources are
used to further the growth potential of poorer nations. The impli-
cations of NIEO on the transfer of technology, structure and terms
of trade, transnational enterprises and development assistance has
a direct relevance to U.S. assistance programs.6
- 17 -
On the occasion of the Seventh Special Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, the Dag Hammorskjold Foundation commissioned
a report entitled "What Now - Another Development" (1975). The
report argues that satisfying the basic needs of the poor should be
the "core of the development process." The report criticizes
past development policies as lacking in basic needs direction, adding
that "self-reliant growth" at the local level is the building block
of development. The existence of an "international power structure"
that has as its basis the "market economy" of the industrialized
nations mitigates against transferring resources to the poor. This
structure is linked in most developing countries to local power
structures that control directly their patterns of growth. By way
of remedy, the recommendation is to transform the structures at the
international as well as local level, in order to balance the existing
inequality of economic relations and allow self-reliant growth.
The report underscores that basic needs should be defined
"according to a normative scale" and in terms of prevailing social
values. Timing and sequencing the delivery of basic goods and
services is a practical requirement, since the scarcity of resources
makes unavoidable a redistribution policy in the short run. Identi-
fying the disadvantaged groups must receive "priority action," so
that resources can be targeted.
Major international organizations have responded to the basic
needs theme and proposed similar policy statements. The World Bank
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and the Organization for Economic Development Cooperation (OECD)
have adopted the BHN approach in their respective programs and
policies. The Bank has been an articulate proponent as evidenced
by the requirement that Official Development Assistance (ODA)
meet basic needs criteria. The Bank has directed attention towards
determining the composition of the core bundle of basic needs,
as well as specifying the benefits of a BHN policy in concessionary
lending. 8
In 1977, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
OECD held a high level meeting which endorsed the BHN approach by
announcing that "progressively larger efforts to programmes meeting
basic human needs" would be supported. 9
2.12 The IDCA View
Prior to 1979, the Agency for International Development was
the figurehead of American foreign assistance. U.S. foreign aid
policies were often referred to as "AID policies." With the advent
of IDCA, these attributions rightfully belong to IDCA.
The background paper prepared for the Development Coordina-
tion Committee (DCC) on basic human needs was first drafted in the
summer of 1977, a year after the ILO World Employment Conference
and four years after the "New Directions" legislation came into
being.
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The New Directions policy directs economic assistance to
reflect "new realities" in its relationships with less developed
countries. The criteria to be followed should emphasize "the
following:
(1) Bilateral development aid should concentrate increasingly
on sharing American technical expertise, farm commodities and
industrial goods to meet critical development problems, and
less on large scale capital transfers, which when made should
be in association with contributions from other industrialized
countries working together in a multilateral framework."10
"(2) Future U.S. bilateral support for development should
focus on critical problems in those functional sectors which
affect the lives of the majority of the people in the devel-
oping countries; food production; rural development and
nutrition; population planning and health; and education,
public administration, and human resource development.""
The Act further states that "assistance under this chapter
should be used not simply for the purpose of transferring financial
resources to LDCs, "but to help countries solve development problems
in accordance with a strategy that aims to increase substantially
the participation of the poor."12
The DCC document spells out the "strategy for U.S. bilateral
development assistance." The fundamental thrust reiterated is that
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"sustained and equitable economic growth" as well as "the basic human
needs" of developing country populations will be effectively
supported.13 It goes on to state that the BHN strategy does not
imply a departure from the "new directions approach" but is a
"further evolution of that approach."
The principal components of IDCA's strategy include:
(1) Assisting the poor to increase their incomes -- through
raising their productivity and access to productive resources
as well as expanding their opportunities for productive
employment;
(2) increasing the availability of and access to goods and
services required to meet basic human needs.
In response to movements within the American polity, the
strategy specifies the inclusion of women as participants in the
decision-making process of a nation so that their "needs, desires,
capacities and indigenous institutions are recognized" along with
those of men. This is a distinction that is usually assumed in the
*
pre-1977 statements of non-U.S. institutions. Another significant
focus of this policy is that basic needs are seen as a "strategy to
enhance political and civil human rights as well as economic rights."
IDCA policy reflects vital U.S. interests in the developing
countries. Its chief concern is to ensure that the security,
political, economic and humanitarian assistance be channeled in
*
The United Nations General Assembly designated 1977 as the Year of
the Woman. This event focused international attention on the role of
women in development, and may explain the attention given to the
role of women in official publications.
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such a way as to protect those interests abroad, however they may
be defined over time. Any deviation from this objective would run
counter to major U.S. foreign policy. As tensions between developed
and developing nations wax and wane, cooperative assistance permits
recognition of the changes in the relationships with other countries.
U.S. assistance has emphasized the use of science and tech-
nology for resolving problems in agriculture, education, health and
major engineering works. Not enough has been done, however, in
linking existing underutilized technologies to specific applications
in pursuit of basic needs. Scientific research has played an
important part in creating high yield rice crops, improving methods
of agro-technical production, animal husbandry and human birth
control. Technology has been used to build hydroelectric dams,
airports and highways. Building an essential infrastructure for
modernization has been the observable emphasis of AID sponsored
technology assistance in the past. In this respect, for example,
satellite imagery techniques have been used to "improve reliability
of socio-economic statistics for rural regions"14 and assess damage
caused by natural disasters. Satellites have also been used to
transmit educational programs into hard-to-reach rural areas. These
projects are considered within the basic needs guidelines, though
they are undoubtedly beneficial to some LDC groups more than others.
The emphasis has not been on appropriate techniques that have a more
direct impact on the problems faced by poorer families. The new thrust
in technology transfer is aimed at counteracting past deficiencies.
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2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BHN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Recurring concepts have dominated the practice of AID develop-
ment planning. However, NIEO or BHN guidelines have been difficult
to follow in a consistent manner. Rural development, population
control health and nutrition, and human resource development are
some of the concepts mentioned. These rubrics are all far too
encompassing and general to have an impact on development problems,
even though they include some BN components. Yet, programs have
been implemented under these general themes. Their- contri-
bution to progress cannot be ignored, especially since these develop-
ment themes, rather than purely fiscal and monetary policies, have
had the most direct impact with basic needs satisfaction in the
past and probably continue to in the future.
The BHN policy represents a departure from conventional
development strategies primarily because of its specific focus on
a target group of the society . . . the poor. The major shift in
emphasis as Streeten (1977) points out in a BHN strategy of development
is towards social services and transfer payments to the poor.15
The BHN approach is considered to be a supplementary and complementary
strategy for existing development programs. The conventional emphasis
on economic growth, employment and reduction of poverty remains
valid, since these are components that determine development gains.
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The main characteristics are described by Lisk (1977) in terms of
personal consumption and basic public services.
The BHN concept has economic dimensions, since it affects the
supply and demand of scarce goods and services. Its justification
is not dependent on economic models, but on elemental value judgments
about the preference of consuming a basket of goods and services
described as "basic." Since it is value judgments that determine
the concept of "basic," BHN cannot be defined in an absolute or
normative sense. The determination of what is basic will depend upon
the perceptions and judgments of consumers and suppliers, as they
establish the effective demand for basic goods and services. The
local environment together with the artificial inducements created
by a public decision making process will specify which items of the
market basket will be sought.16
Planners have argued that the arbitrariness of the concept
does not in any way invalidate the BHN approach. What is suggested,
however, is that recognition be given to problems of application
and that no absolute determinants be imposed when considering the
alternatives and trade-offs in the package of public and private
consumption of goods and services deemed desirable.
In fact, the critical point of controversy among development
planners, politicians and investors is how to resolve the problems
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encountered in orchestrating public and private resources to
achieve both balanced growth and BHN objectives. Technology is
a significant input in the equation for balanced growth and
contributes to filling the basic needs basket.
An important assumption underlying the BHN approach is that
the poor are basic needs optimizers. In other words, given the
availability of income and products, the poor as a group would
make the best possible use of their resources to purchase food,
clothing and shelter before purchasing non-basic goods. In this
respect, the poor have to be considered as rational, though imperfect
consumers in the same vein as higher income groups are. Applying
this assumption means that the treatment of the poor in public
programming must be upgraded. Respect for individuals of all
income groups cancels the odious paternalism which marks most
public programs, and enables the creative application of programs
that complement existing programs. For example, consumerism,
protection of the environment, energy alternatives, appropriate
technology applications to solve the basic problems could all improve
the quality of life for the poor.
A valid observation made by Streeten (1977) about the role
of the BHN approach is that it supplements and complements existing
development strategies. An opposing view held by AID planners is
that it is an evolution in development thought culminating nearly
thirty years of experience.17 The pragmatic view is of an approach
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which makes up for deficiencies in existing development strategies
and mutually reinforces strengths. This view has political appeal
because it allows for shifts in policy so that resources can be
redirected without invalidating past actions. BHN also calls for
serious analysis and experimentation of new ideas about how to reach
the poor more effectively -- an area of investigation in need of
attention.
AID programs have stressed economic growth, generation of
employment and reduction of poverty levels as independent program
objectives. The BHN strategy attempts to combine these objectives
in a holistic manner so that the right emphasis is given to
situational conditions. In effect, what the BHN approach requires
is an interdisciplinary commitment that has been given little
importance in past AID programs. Consequently, a different
organizational mind set and structure is required which is supportive
of the basic needs approach.
There is some disillusionment with the past performance of U.S.
development efforts. This is in part due to the paucity of
information available to link causes of programs with effects.
The magnitude of the global poverty problem, together with the
meager financial commitment by all countries to attack its causes
are another reason for discouragement. Financial resources alone
cannot be considered the reason for past failures, however. Each
nation's willingness to direct attention to development issues
contributes to the success or failure of any strategy. Allocation
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of limited resources to achieve the highest social benefits requires
finely tuned planning and management. Development cooperation
institutions have attempted to resolve the BHN/balanced growth
dilemma by refocusing their policies in support of egalitarian
strategies which itself is a cause for hope. 18
LDC Efforts
Contrary to income strategies which emphasize raising per
capita income levels, the BHN approach stresses the nature of what
is provided as an end result. This interpretation is less abstract
than eliminating poverty -or reducing unemployment (Streeten, 1977).
Several strategies have been implemented by public agencies
in LDCs that in one way or another address this problem. At the
country level, for example, progressive tax policies, subsidies to
propulsive industries and monetary policies have encouraged invest-
ment and provided some controls over inflation. Embodied in these
strategies is the belief that capital accumulation is the principal
ingredient for economic growth; that foreign exchange should be avail-
able free of encumbrances for trade to flourish; that developing
countries should industrialize quickly. What has been lacking is
an approach to development that targets resources to groups facing
special problems and programs designed to resolve those problems.
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A strategy which embraces the BN philosophy comes close to meeting
these requirements, but lacks the organizational wherewithal to
assure operational capability.
2.3 A RECOMMENDED BHN APPROACH FOR ISTC
The principal reasons for adopting a basic needs approach to
development plans are generally accepted by the international
community. If disagreement exists, it is in specific actions. No
public official can deny that the reduction of the worst manifesta-
tions of poverty is a worthwhile policy. Channeling specific
resources to groups identified as deficient in these resources is
a responsibility of development institutions. The political aspects
of a policy that shifts resources to the poor, however, can serve
to thwart the aims of international donors.
Prioritizing satisfaction of basic needs implies ordering
program priorities. Since not all demands for basic goods can
possibly be met at a given time, government at the local level is
faced with decisions of which needs to meet first. A determination
of minimum acceptable levels for all basic needs goods in a given
setting is an essential first step in assessing priorities. This
is usually done by arriving at a core bundle of goods which can then
be priced and quantified. Another BHN feature closely related to
ordering priorities is targeting assistance.
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Targeting development resources is an ancillary concept of
the BHN approach. First, groups with special needs are identified,
then programs are designed to satisfy those needs. In this way,
fewer resources are used to combat the incidence of poverty and
consequently attain greater efficiency of available resources.
Targets are not limited to the reduction of absolute poverty only,
but extend to the satisfaction of needs above a subsistence level
as a means of eliminating relative poverty (Lisk, 1977) and raising
living standards. 19
One question that remains unanswered is whether or not the
BHN approach leads to different country focus as well as a different
focus within the country. The implications for ISTC are that, since
BHN policy does signify a change in program content, a change in
organizational structure and behavior is imminent. Implementation
of BHN policy can be successful only if it is conducted through an
appropriate organizational environment that supports the basic human
needs approach.
Basic human needs policy is a source of conflict in programming
because it is variously defined. There are no absolutes which can
insure that a given institution will pursue similar strategies
with the same concerns. Developing country governments, in
operational terms, are not as enlightened as one would hope
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they might be in implementing the BHN approach. Conflicts exist
between local coalitions which do not share the same view about the
abilities of the poor to achieve self-reliance. Attitudinal factors
operating in many LDC governments prevent affirmative actions to be
taken along the guidelines of the BHN approach. ISTC planners must
take into account the susceptivity of LDC technological institutions
to adopt a BHN strategy as part of the substance of their ongoing
programs. In addition, some countries most responsive to the BHN
approach are likely to have lower priority in U.S. foreign policy
decisions affecting scientific and technological cooperation.
Consequently, a BHN approach which ISTC could implement would
be one which takes into consideration each country's definition of
its priority needs as well as considers the general "shopping list"
in ISTC's present plans. The effective approach should also
consider programs supported by local government allocations for
funding and require the specific identification of groups whose needs
are to be met. A final element in a BHN approach fitting ISTC's
thrust as a scientific and technological institute would be to
include organized participation in the development of programs calling
for modern technological industrialization of micro-industry.
The long term effects of industrial technology must be carefully
analysed to insure that traditional technologies, which are generally
labor absorptive, are not displaced by modern technology. Or that the
need for resources does not result in the substitution of equipment
and materials for excess labor. Economic growth, spurred by
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technological innovation is insufficient as a means of meeting basic
needs in the next twenty years. Growth must be accompanied by the
generation of sufficient and adequately compensated jobs.
This is the basic human needs area to which ISTC must ultimately
address itself.
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"Societies will, of course, wish to exercise
prudence in deciding which technologies...
that is, which applications of science, are
to be pursued and which not. But without
funding basic research, without supporting the
acquisition of knowledge for its own sake, our
options become dangerously limited."
Carl Sagan
The Dragons of Eden: Speculations
On the Evolution Of Human Intelligence
3.0 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION
Introduction
This section describes the issues of cooperation in transferring
scientific and technological know-how to institutions in developing
countries through the organizational structure of the Institute for
Scientific and Technological Cooperation.
The distinction between science and technology is central to the
discussion of the issues of technology cooperation and transfer. How
science and technology are considered determines the functions to be
performed by each in order to achieve a particular development objective.
This is the cleavage which differentiates the types of programs and
the strategy that ISTC will need to implement.
Scientific and technological cooperation suggests three
concurrent processes: (1) Enlisting the association of developing
country institutions in enterprises that yield mutual benefits.
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(2) Conveying scientific research skills and
technical know-how to public and private groups in developing countries.
(3) Obtaining resources and managing programs
with the assistance of appropriate organizations.
In order to put these three processes into action, ISTC must
manage the points of controversy which impede their realization. The
purpose of this section is to offer a description of the issues
surrounding these processes.
The Problem
The operational success of the Institute depends on enlisting the
cooperation of developing country institutions and on effectively managing
the process of appropriate technology transfers.
The Constraints
The crucial factors which impinge on these processes are the
economics of research activity, the costs of transferring technology,
the political constraints and the role of patents. These factors are
examined as part of the transfer process. "Transfer" refers to the
processes by which both science and technology can effectively be
conveyed to others for the resolution of specific development problems.
Empirical studies, referred to in Section 3.2, suggest that
certain organizational designs are more effective than others for trans-
ferring scientific and technological information and skills. The optimal
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organizational structure is also determined by the nature and purpose of
the transfer. The Institute's proposed mechanisms for transfer and
cooperation are examined in the context of these factors.
Distinction Between Science and Technology
Science and technology are not the same, although the latter is
dependent upon the former. Science is a human learning process based
on systematized knowledge derived from observation, study and experiment
of things and events. Its purpose is to ascertain the principles of what is
being studied. It is also a method for conducting research based on a
theoretical explanation of the meaning of the observations in terms of
practical applications. The knowledge people have of their immediate
environment is advanced by scientific discovery, which is the quality
that makes science a powerful tool for acquiring deeper insights into
1
the world around us. Science provides the basic knowledge necessary to
create the technology for the production of new goods and services,
although science, per se, is not immediately marketable.
Technology is a process for applying scientific knowledge to
useful purposes. From its applications, societies derive those products
which are needed or desired. It is a technical art based on applied science.
Technology embraces a wide range of man's creations from the very simple
levers to the extremely complex utilization of machines, materials and
concepts. Using appropriate technological advances expands the
possibilities nations have to create more employment options for the
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benefit of their people; thus contributing to the improvement of living
standards. Technology has its dark side: it can work against human
welfare when uncontrolled by-products destroy the natural habitat.
Patents and copyrights are the legal mechanisms which limit the commer-
cialization and control the methods of manufacturing products dependent
upon certain technologies.
The social function of science is to advance human knowledge about
the world around us, whereas the function of technology is to turn that
knowledge into means of controlling the world around us. Science is
mostly involved with basic research, while technology is associated with
the application of basic research. The importance of the differences
between science and technology can best be appreciated in the way each
contributes to development. Science provides understanding about how
principles operate under specific conditions. Its basic product is
information about peoplethings and events. Technology transforms
scientific knowledge into detailed engineering services or methods
which contribute to the rate of production and output.
Because ISTC purports to offer developing countries cooperation
in both areas, the issues affecting both science and technology must be
addressed. The transfer of science implies a set of activities involving
university research facilities, academic personnel and modes of knowledge
transfer. The transfer of technology implies activities and involvement
with another type of research institutions, personnel and modes of skill
transfers. Although there is interchange and sometimes overlap between
the two areas, one has been traditionally considered public domain while
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the other is primarily private sector. ISTC's activities must reflect
these differences which directly affect the type of cooperation sought.
The description of the issues surrounding cooperation and transfer
is meant to help clarify thinking about the possible alternatives for
making the Institute operational and consonant with the basic human
needs mandate of the legislation.
3.1 ISSUES AND FACTORS IN ACHIEVING COOPERATION
Achievement of the kind of cooperation which is feasible and
desireable in the context of the Institute's programs will ultimately
depend on the resolution of the issues related to enlisting cooperation,
conveying skills and know-how, and obtaining the necessary resources to
manage the programs.
An issue. common to all three of these processes is that of the
relationship between the technology transferred and the problem to be
solved. United States foreign assistance agencies, as well as other
industrialized nations' development organizations, have encountered
similiar difficulty in getting the creators of technology to focus on
problems of grass-roots development in developing countries at any
significant scale. The capital-intensive and often complex technology
which is the mainstay of industrialized nations is often not suited for
resolving the production problems faced by the poor in developing
countries. Another drawback of industrial technologies is that they
tend to produce goods that are priced above the ability of the poor to
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afford and in addition tend to displace human resources from the
production process. Any technology which relies on capital intensive
methods generally ignores the need to incorporate the abundant labor
supply. Somehow, however, labor must be absorbed if developing countries
are to achieve balanced growth.
What is needed is to reinforce the validity of appropriate
technologies -- a technology that fits the circumstances and, in
particular, uses available human labor. Such a technology is an
intermediate one which offers prospects of continuous development in
2
the future (Schumaher, 1973.) Appropriate applications of technology
also mitigate the oppresive social distortions which affect employment
demand and commodity prices.
Cooperation in the areas of scientific and technological activity
is a plausible way to narrow the gaps between developing and developed
countries; especially with respect to the utilization of appropriate
technology.
Appropriate technology is a term gaining acceptance and used to describe
an intermediate application of technology, usually referring to the
level of sophistication of the hardware employed in the production of a
good. For example, foot-powered irrigation pumps as opposed to engine-
driven pumps are apprDriate technology in areas where human labor is
more plentiful and cheaper than electricity or petroleum fuel. The term
and concept were first introduced by E.F. Schumacher, Ca. 1965. See
Dunn, P.D. Appropriate Technology, Technology With A Human Face, New York:
Schochen Books, 1979.
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3.11 Enlisting Cooperation
U.S. Foreign assistance programs have traditionally sought the
cooperation of participating governments in most development programs.
Clearly, without a minimum level of participation, little can be
accomplished by way of cooperation. At the initiative of the Institute,
however, groups and institutions in LDCs are being asked to enter into
a new form of cooperation agreement in joint enterprises for mutual
benefit based on the sharing of specialized skills.
Cooperation, on the other hand, is becoming increasingly
difficult to obtain as a result of changes in the power relations
among many developing nations. Further, energy scarcity and the potential
depletion of natural resources are affecting the accustomed fast-paced
industrial growth of developed countries. Finally, the call for a New
International Economic Order (NIEO), discussed in Section 2.0, points
to still other reasons for changes in the relationships between
developing and developed nations. Whatever long term cooperative
arrangements are entered into will necessarily reflect the LDC's
insistence on more equitable allocation of non-replenishable resources.
In particular, interdependence will require that more LDCs negotiate
restrictions on flows of resources originating in developing countries.
It is becoming evident that, for these reasons, industrialized nations
3
will have to seek "new types of cooperation efforts" to deal with
the resource constraints to rapid growth both in their own economies
and those of the LDCs with whom cooperation is essential.
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In addition to the economic and technical factors complicating
the pursuit of cooperation, international geopolitics impress stiff
constraints on ISTC's approach toward the developing nations. The
issue of national dependence on foreign technology has evoked mixed
reactions among leaders in developing countries. Cooperation, according
to ISTC's mandate, is to be sought not only with LDC institutions but
among various U.S. public and private agencies doing research on
development problems of common interest. Strengthening the techno-
logical capabilities of developing countries will require some
institution building based on educational exchanges in order to
provide the needed manpower. The prevailing mood, among nationalist
governments in particular, however, is to lessen dependence on U.S.
5
technology for the solution of local problems. The literature on
development economics, in fact, contains supporting evidence that
6
cooperative ties have not always been beneficial to LDCs. Reasons
cited are the role of outside experts who in the past have failed to
enlist truly cooperative ties with LDC scientists and engineers and the
effect of culture and language barriers on a program's goals. In
pursuit of the objective to enlist cooperation, ISTC will face its
greatest challenge -- forging quid pro quo cooperative agreements that
serve the long term interests of both LDC and U.S. institutions. Finally,
the terms of cooperation through ISTC must face the structure of LDCs'
demands for economic parity. The promise of strengthening scientific
* ISTC plans call for building up LDCs "research and development
capacities." Capacity implies aptitude, qualifications, functions,
competency. Capability is more the practical ability to do something or
to develop the features not yet utilized. The difference is important.
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and technological capabilities is but a meager gesture toward correcting
the imbalance between the industrialized and non-industrialized
countries. Therefore, the structure of cooperation which ISTC employs must
help equalize wealth distributions in the world.
Cooperation in the transfer of technology development among
developing nations became an agenda topic at the Group of 77 countries
meeting in February 6-10, 1979 in Arusha, Tanzania. A group of high
level government experts met in Quito, Ecuador in March of 1979 under
the auspices of the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL),
calling for the reafirmation of a "code of conduct for the transfer of
technology" that would be universally applicable under the conditions
agreed to in the Arusha conference earlier that year.
The objectives of the code are:
(1) To abolish the restrictive and unfair practices
which affect the transfer of technology.
(2) To strengthen the technological capacity of the
developing countries.
(3) To increase the international flow of the different
forms of technology in conditions favourable to the developing countries.
ISTC's plans are directed toward meeting the second objective, but
objectives one and three are either ignored in the planning documents or
the bias is toward "mutual benefits" without tipping the balance in favor
of the developing country.
* The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recommended
cooperative links as a response to the New International Economic Order
guideline to resolve the problems of science and technology transfer. See
E/CEPAL/1073 (March 12-16, 1979), pp. 38-39.
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3.12 Conveying Skills and Know-How
How can scientific and technological cooperation mutually
benefit U.S. and developing country interests? This issue can be
appreciated in terms of the two client groups involved: the public
and private sectors. The major assumption underlying cooperation is
that LDC institutions have a demand for the kind of programs and
resources ISTC will offer.
Conveying scientific research and development capacity to a
widely different population and institutional system requires
identifying what kinds of skills and at what level of competence these
skills will be delivered. Private and public sector programs not only
will have need for a different capacity-building structure but will also
pursue different development objectives.
Long term objectives in the public domain may involve primary and
secondary science education programs as supplements to the existing
curricula. Higher education, already considered highly irrelevant
and costly in many LDCs, is nevertheless a likely candidate for some of
ISTC's programs. The diversion of public resources toward elite educa-
tional investment will be a difficult policy choice to make under
circumstances of fiscal austerity. Education for the majority popula-
tion spreads the economic benefits of education more equitably than
concentrating too much resources for the benefit of a few. If raising
the level of professional competence becomes the mutual interest pursued,
the immediate consequences will have to be weighed against long term goals.
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Alternative choices and their consequences will also have to be
considered. The introduction of a change in basic policy, curriculum
or staffing in an educational institution results in major changes in
structure and management. Changes in educational structures are reputed
to be the most intractable of problems among LDC institutions.
The private sector is faced with similiar dilemmas: either slow
the rate of growth by lessening dependence on technical labor or import
technical skills and fall into the dependence trap. For expansion to
take place, private sector industries must choose between labor intensive
or capital intensive means of production. In the technical ranks the
demand for qualified professionals will increase regradless of production
method or rate of growth scenario. Transferring the necessary skills
will require, then, that the training system consistently prepare
competent technicians, engineers and scientists. This area of coope-
ration has not been fully investigated, as the poor performance of
current arrangements demonstrates. The only exceptions can be found
among the middle tier countries where mid-level technicians perform
at a par with those in developed industrialized economies.
Two categories of capacity building are mentioned in the ISTC
proposal: Skill development in practical problem solving and cooperation
in joint research problems affecting the lives of the majority of
people in the developing countries. This specificity, if carried to
conclusion, has direct implications for the types of training
programs and techniques which can be adopted and adapted. At what
level will technical skills be developed and for whom? U.S. tech-
nicians will benefit from the training efforts, either as instructors
or as trainees. Among the LDCs, those most likely to receive benefits
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will be a few educated elites. The transfer of the necessary education
to meet the future demands of balanced growth and the more immediate
program objectives of helping the poor will determine the kind of
cooperation that must be negotiated. Practical problem-solving skills
are expected to be developed through fellowships in U.S. institutions
or through special programs. However well intentioned a U.S. institution
may be, it will nevertheless not be able to adequately prepare foreign
scientists and engineers unless its own educational curricula are
changed to address appropriate technology methods.
Conveying technical skills will require an adaptation of
teaching methods as well as technologies in ways that take into account
7
the impact of change on the socio-political structures of LDCs.
Traditional technical aid has for the most part centered on theoretical
economic problems and less on the relationships between cultural change
and economic growth (Herskovits, 1972). Equally ignored has been the
impact of technology on the socio-cultural underpinnings of developing
nations. The controversial relationship btween technical imperatives
and long term development is an issue begging attention in the ISTC plan.
3.13 Obtaining Resources and Managing Programs
A third set of factors hinders the concurrent process of seeking
cooperation: (1) The efforts made to procure the appropriate staff,
commodities and support from U.S. and developing country sources, and
(2) The management of these resources with the participation of a like-
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minded network of LDC organizations within the sphere of ISTC's
influence.
Before any positive results can be expected, the circumstances
and conditions that foster cooperative agreements must be spelled out.
These are:
(a) selection of qualified social planners, scientists,
engineers, etc., by criteria of the BHN approach. Basic human
needs criteria can help identify compatible characteristics
in individuals and offer a common ground for work both for U.S.
and LDC participants.
(b) planning for the participation of LDC counterparts as an
example of the Institute's style. An organizational environ-
ment supportive of ISTC's philosophy can help overcome resistance
to change in a more provident manner than by artificial mechan-
isms or cooption.
(c) timely procurement of the necessary offices and equipment
will serve to verify intentions and counteract the cynicism
surrounding many AID projects.
(d) securing funds for payment of factor costs will encourage
broader participation and cooperation.
Securing mutual support for ISTC may prove to be a major problem
from both the U.S. and LDC point of view. The battle currently being
waged in a House-Senate Conference Committee over the appropriations
for ISTC may be read by LDCs as a sign that the Institute does not
have serious Congressional support and is likely to discourage cooperation
from LDC groups. Management of the proposed programs necessarily
involves operating agreements yet to be negotiated, many of a long
term nature. Bargaining positions are unduly biased in favor of the
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giver, possibly because the ISTC proposal was generated by AID and
follows its patterns.
Institutions in many LDCs have always been at a disadvantage
when negotiating private and public mutual assistance pacts with U.S.
officials or transnational corporations. Bargaining power differen-
tials, however, can be substantially altered over time by improving
the capability of LDC negotiators, thereby shifting the power balance
from U.S. dominance to LDC parity, a goal more consonant with ideals
of cooperation. This type of assistance constitutes a first step
toward the attack on broader development problems. Training local
scientists, engineers, social planners, economists, and folklore
experts in designing, implementing, and evaluating participatory
projects/policies represents a primary responsibility of ISTC, but
one which is not made explicit in the planning documents.
Identification of appropriate research and development (R&D)
institutions that pursue goals similar to ISTC's will not be easy.
Most LDC institutions operate through conventional structures8 and
according to values distinct from U.S. norms. Many pursue policies
that are neither inspired by a basic needs approach, nor liberational
in purpose. ISTC prefers to manage its programs through existing
LDC organizations. The imposition of new policies and purposes on
these institutions would require more time, negotiation, and financial
incentive than ISTC can muster. Creation of a new delivery structure
for research could quickly deplete ISTC's resources. ISTC's probable
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solution would be to rely on U.S. institutions and disregard the
problems of interfacing with counterparts because the Institute
reflects the interest of U.S. universities that are in a position
to benefit most from research initiatives.
The relationship with private sector industry faces similar
problems. Can a new foreign aid structure be compelling enough, in
a period of waning confidence in federal programs, to attract private
sector R&D involvement in programs directed primarily to meeting
basic human needs? What incentive will attract private sector insti-
tutions? On what criteria will cooperating institutions be selected?
How will mutual benefit be determined? AID's cumulative experience
has been with public, not private sector institutions. The new ISTC
must be able to interface with both, but these questions are unanswered
in the ISTC proposal.
3.2 THE TRANSFER PROCESS
Experts have observed that technology transfer is a fine phrase
to describe broad generalities, but consider it a "dangerous reference
when the time comes for implementation and measuring results against
...assumed objectives."9 The goals ISTC will be pursuing are mandated
by legislation: better ways to meet basic human needs and attain
equitable growth through strategies which strengthen LDC capacities
in the areas of science and technology.10
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The objectives of the transfer process are to convey needed and
requested scientific and technological expertise in an appropriate
manner to developing country institutions and groups. This objective
calls for collaborative work relationships with "private sector
business, labor and private enterprise organizations"" in order to
improve the environment and process of technology transfer.
The Institute's proposed mechanisms for transfer include work
with U.S. scientific and technical institutions to improve the
training of students from developing countries as well as develop
joint research opportunities.
As a "central research and new technology development agency"
ISTC will interface with R&D centers in the U.S. and in developing
countries. The principal support is directed at "institution-to-
institution contracts." 12
Programs will concentrate on current concerns of U.S. assistance.
The mechanism proposed is to work through the Problem Area Offices
with links to LDC institutions. Grants and contractual support
arrangements will focus on broad problem areas. Close to 80 percent
of program funds are expected to support research and capacity
building. The remaining 20 percent is destined to pay for policy
studies, encourage the process of technological cooperation and
"provide immediate support for new and creative unprogrammed oppor-
tunities." 13
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In summary, the mechanisms are institutional in nature. A
combination of techniques are suggested, such as workshops, long term
training via fellowships, and institution building. What emerges is
a variation of a scientific, technological brokerage operation with
a narrowly defined mandate and specific functions.
3.21 Components of the Transfer Process
The diffusion of technology has been traced in a number of
studies conducted over the past forty years. These findings indicate
that the rate of transfer from basic research to applied research is
remarkably slow. (Allen, 1978) But once the applications of science
and technology are commercialized, the transfers are much more rapid.14
Transfer of technological information takes two directions:
horizontal and vertical. Vertical transfer converts a scientific idea
or technical information into a specific device or production process.15
Horizontal transfer refers to conveying technical information from
one project to another. Spin-offs of innovation from one firm to
another are known as horizontal transfers. 16 For example, today's
computer technology was born in the first computing devices (electro-
mechanical) created for the assembly of the first atomic bomb funded
by the Manhattan Project.
ISTC's proposal will involve both vertical and horizontal
transfers. Management of the transfer process covers three principal
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functions: materials transfer, design transfer and capacity transfer.
Each is considered as a separate stage in the transfer process requiring
an appropriate management structure. The first stage begins with the
importation of materials with no adaptation to the local environment.17
A manufacturer simply brings into the plant all the materials needed
for the manufacture of the product. The second stage involves the
introduction of the capability, technical staff and equipment necessary
to manufacture the product. The third and final stage engages external
expertise for longer periods of time and includes the capacity to modify
existing technology to create indigenous technology. This last stage
is the focus of ISTC.
Even the seemingly easy adoption of a more efficient process
within a firm, no matter how experienced or successful, requires
complex managerial initiatives to implement the necessary changes.
This also holds true for a firm that has developed an operational
environment and stability prior to adopting the technology in
question. 18 The case becomes even more complicated when a developing
country is involved in the technology transfer process, which is the
immediate case for the Institute.
3.22 Information Sharing
Technological adoptations are controlled by those with access
to sources of information about technology. A study of Irish manu-
facturing firms (Allen, 1973)19 suggests that the scientist's
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ability to maintain contacts and keep abreast of new technological
developments is determined by the amount of personal contact an
individual has with the sources of information. Technological infor-
mation can be imported by personal contact more effectively than
through an institutional format. If developing nations are inclined
to foster technical information sharing, it would seem that the best
conduits for this purpose are the informal channels.
The implication is that domestically educated researchers should
do some work outside their own countries. Foreign sabbaticals would be
supported by local governments. Although this practice has been
criticized for its high cost and individual focus, its positive
results must be weighed against the relative ineffectiveness of other
modes of transfer. Potential problems for ISTC revolve around a
seemingly universal tendency of government bureaucracies to reward
political favors rather than meritorious achievement with trips
abroad. The fear that the best performers will be lured away from
work in the home country is another unspoken factor influencing
the selection of fellows for foreign study. The benefits of exchange
must be made evident to cooperating countries in order to balance the
perceived risks.
3.23 Empirical Findings
Empirical evidence has produced insights about the process of
technology transfer. Works by Allen, Teece, Mansfield, and Cooney
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have shown that the process is generally complex but little is known
about its nuances. What works in one situation may not work in
another. One general trend which is important from a planner's
perspective is the emergence of the technological gatekeeper20 as
a go-between in international commercial technology transfers. The
"gatekeeper" is an intermediary among firms, governments and nations.
The value of the gatekeeper is determined by the personal ability to
emulate the characteristics of the technologist or scientist who has
initiated the new idea. To be a gatekeeper, then, requires that the
individual be more competent, productive, and qualified than his or
her colleagues.21 Technological gatekeepers must be keenly aware of
what constitutes the current advances in the field of dominance or
line of work. In fact, the studies mentioned above suggest that the
gatekeeper's role in international technology transfer can become more
sophisticated as the volume of transfers increases and the country
becomes actively engaged in the expansion of its industrial sector.
For ISTC to accomplish its mandate to foster cooperation, it clearly
must be able to serve this gatekeeper function forthe projects it
originates and fosters.
The most significant empirical discovery related to the gate-
keeping function is that interpersonal contact among.scientists can
be effectively managed. Technology transfer policy has thus far
tended to overemphasize the value of documentation as a means of
diffusion of technical information. The reason given is that at least
"the problem of dealing with documentation . . . appears to be
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manageable."2 2 Managing human resources is more complicated and
subject to uncertainty which may account for the reliance on reports,
studies, and printed matter that often is regarded as technology
transfer. This trend can, however, be reversed if, during the transfer
process, the emphasis of the transfer is redirected to focus on
collaborative management of informational/educational linkages by
carefully designing the process of interpersonal contact among scien-
tists.
3.24 Technology Transfer Constraints
The fact that some applications of technology are in demand
does not ease the acquisition of utilitarian innovations. There are
constraints that affect the free flow of technological innovation.
Industrialized nations have the major technology and to a great extent
control its diffusion. Complex interactions among international
factors, markets, and organizations restrict the kinds of innovations
that can be made available to developing countries. A one-of-a-kind
idea is closely guarded. In addition, the unpredictable changes
brought on by social revolt affect the relationships with multi-
nationals and impact local political stability and policy direction.
These changes impose serious constraints on the cooperation and
exchange for mutual benefit goals of the ISTC proposal.
The usual list of constraints impeding technology exchange is
replete with reference to the incapacity of LDC institutions to
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absorb new technology at a steady rate and the lack of sufficiently
prepared personnel who can implement socio-economic projects. These
constraints reflect more the symptoms than the causes of interference
in technological cooperation. First order issues are those that
directly affect causes, for example: the economic viability of the
transfer, the costs involved, the political ramifications of the
transfer, and the role of patents and copyrights.
The problems posed by each of these categories of constraint
are examined in the following sub-sections.
3.241 Economic Implications of Technology Transfer
The fundamental reason for ISTC's support of intermediate and
long term research on the critical problems of development is that
from these transfers a major contribution to economic growth is
expected. By making accessible appropriate technology to LDCs, the
overall process of development is accelerated. Another belief behind
ISTC's creation as a vehicle for the support of local research and
capacity development is that practical solutions to the more intrac-
table problems of poverty will most likely be solved by local
technical talent.
In many industrialized democracies, government sponsored
institutions together with private sector contributions support the
development of new industrial technologies. For example, many of
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the advances made by the Japanese manufacturing firms are acknowledged
to be a direct result of collaborative efforts between public and
private research and development organizations.
A publicly funded institute cannot survive for long if the
canons of market utility of its products are overlooked. When funding
public research, the criteria that its products must meet effective
market demand whenever possible cannot be ignored. In fact, success
in creating a new profitable problem solving device increases the
likelihood of obtaining support for basic research by local govern-
ments. The global picture of investment in science and technology
programs involving research can be put into perspective by looking
at the amounts allocated to research by different countries. The
U.S. does not contribute more than two percent of GNP towards
research investment and developing countries as a group allocate
less than one percent. It remains to be seen if the technologies
developed through ISTC's intervention will generate profits for
ISTC and the associated LDC institutions and if those profits will
be reinvested in further research.
Adopting technological innovations can change the ratio of
technical to non-technical inputs in the production process and thus
becomes a significant component of the employment/growth process of
an economy. It affects directly the ratios of labor to capital in
the process of production, thereby impacting the labor absorption
objectives of balanced growth strategies. These effects operate
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independently of fixed factors, such as geographic location, popula-
tion, and infrastructure which also contribute to the feasibility
of adopting an innovation without displacing labor.
The exact measurement of the impact of a technological package
on the labor demand in one firm or industry can be misleading when
projected to the macro-economic level. Impact analyses are more
meaningful when the effects on labor demand of specialized techno-
logies are disaggregated by firm, region and sector.
In the agricultural sector, for example, it is extremely
difficult to predict with any significant accuracy what the effects
of technological adoption are on the economic growth of either the
*
sector or the region. As John Mellor points out, technological
change in agriculture is highly erratic; it is also cumbersome and
often futile to try to determine which crops or which regions will
benefit from the opportunities of technological advance at a given
time.24
Whenever technology affects employment levels, public policy
makers, employers and labor unions are the first to react. The
*
The economic unit that lends itself to analysis is the region.
Impact assessments of public policy can be better appreciated at
this level. National aggregates tend to distort the true impact
of a strategy, thereby making comparisons meaningless, particularly
when only one industry introduces a technological innovation. The
problem with the regional approach is in defining the region.
However, for purpose of this discussion, the regional boundaries
are those defined by local usage.
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reaction may involve the justified protection of jobs, and if need be,
pressure on policy makers to reject technologies that shift produc-
tion in ways that devalue labor. Developing country governments are
for the most part in agreement with the notion that public policies
must control production methods in order to insure that labor
intensive investments are given priority.25 Common belief holds
that technology is another word for job displacement and should
therefore be resisted. ISTC has thus far argued that technology can
help increase the employment rate in a developing region by creating
opportunities for labor. It will be critical for ISTC to demonstrate
through its projects that increasing appropriate technology can, in
fact, stimulate employment.
3.242 Transfer Costs
Transfer costs are the prices paid for the transmission and
adoption by a given firm or organization for the necessary knowledge,
skills, equipment and related maintenance of the new technology to
be acquired. 2 6
The effective transfer of marketable processes, materials,
equipment or ideas has associated with it implementation bottle-
necks, some of which are directly related to the magnitude and
distribution of costs. In a strictly economic sense, if the
benefits to be derived are less than the costs incurred in obtaining
- 58 -
the benefits, then the acquisition of the technology has a negative
utility to the recipient institution. This holds true, however,
only if the recipient pays all the costs and reaps all the benefits.
Otherwise, the society and the specific institutions may receive very
disparate costs and benefits from a particular project.
If we look upon the transfer process as an activity involving
three sets of participants, i.e., donors, intermediaries, and
recipients, each component of cost and benefit can be factored out
among the three participants. Assume a private firm as the donor.
Its costs would include the opportunity foregone when key people
are taken from their duties and temporarily engaged in the transfer
activity. From the recipient's perspective, these are the costs
paid for consultant fees and services.
Intermediaries play a special function in the transfer process.
Their costs are directly attributable to the transfer. For example,
one Problem Area defined in the ISTC proposal calls for the assess-
ment of natural resources. (see Section 4.2) In this case,
satellite technology will be used for mapping inaccessible resource
rich areas. Accurate survey of these areas is made possible by a
combination of remote sensing techniques, satellite imagery, field
study, local investigation and advanced data analysis---a specialized
technology dominated by a few firms.27 Brokerage of these services
relies on an intermediary who will act as a go-between for the
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different agencies at the onset of the assessment. The fee constitutes
part of the overall cost to the recipient firm of the technology
transfer.
Foreign exchange needed to pay for consultant services repre-
sents a cost passed to the central government, negligible as it may be
at the onset. The greater the dependency on external services, the
more likely imbalances of foreign exchange earnings will be. Radical
political economists view this dependency as heightening the economic,
political and cultural subordination of the LDCs to U.S. interests. 2 8
Depending on the manufacturing process in question, the cost
of patent rights and recurrent outlays for service fees or equipment
resulting from a new technology are typically accrued to the final
user, or the recipient. Production start-up costs can be enormous
if the transfer includes the retraining of employees or the acqui-
sition of more advanced machinery. In some cases, the recipient
absorbs a very expensive retooling investment that requires
training of labor beyond its initial commitment or capacity. Estab-
lishing specialized schools and developing didactic methods appropriate
for the cultural setting can escalate acquisition costs further.
Costs of science and technology can be staggering, as can be
appreciated. Among those countries whose national budgets are already
strained, allocating sufficient amounts of funds to science and
technology policy pursuits may entail great political risk. More
precise, comprehensive information upon which to make these decisions
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is needed, including knowledge of the cultural and psycho-dynamic
processes of political behavior. This type of information helps
explain the practical problems encountered in an attempt to divert
funds from programs offering private interests direct benefits
to programs with longer time frames having unclear distributional
results. Present cost outlays cannot be easily justified without
consideration of the benefits that science and technology will bring
to the poor and without public negotiation of the interests of the
widest spectrum of the population.
3.243 Political Constraints
Bilateral foreign development assistance frequently becomes
the carrot in U.S. foreign policy decisions. Nationalization of
U.S. owned industries, seizures of American fishing vessels,
non-democratic election procedures that abridge human rights or
any of a variety of political acts can cut off a developing
country's U.S. aid.
Beyond these obvious political expressions' domain are the
issues which affect national security and world environmental
balances.
Perhaps the major political issue of technology transfer
centers around the security concerns of the U.S. and its allies.
The energy (fuel) shortage is by any measure a worldwide crisis
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that affects every person directly or indirectly. Much of the
present research on alternative sources of energy supplies has
been made on the basis of high-end technology adoptions. Nuclear
power has met public resistance as an alternative supplement to
fuel energy needs in developed countries; it cannot safely be
considered a source in developing countries. Global security can
be threatened by irresponsible uses of technology that fabricates
harmful by-products, as is the case with nuclear waste.
Armaments transfer, long a part of U.S. assistance programs,
has had the unfortunate consequence of strengthening the political
role of the military in developing countries. Because of their
training as highly specialized technicians in the operation of
weapons and support systems, intelligence operations, zero-based
budgeting, financial management and civilian crowd control, the
military is usually perceived as better organized to undertake
civilian responsibilities for governance. This type of assistance,
growing out of American concern for the security interests of
the U.S., has made it possible for a disproportionate number of the
military to be placed in charge of civilian public agencies as the
most highly trained personnel available. This military preponder-
ance could have a number of problem consequences for ISTC programs:
expansion of the number of trained LDC civilian personnel may be
more difficult, introduction of BHN goals may be contrary to preva-
lent military goals and, of most consequence, the continued impact
of military aid may completely overshadow any influence of ISTC
sponsored programs.
- 62 -
3.244 The Role of Patents
In countries where trade protection is a national policy,
the role of patents will figure prominently in the technology
transfer process. For this reason a patent restriction may pose
a constraint to certain kinds of technology adoptions since they
award "exclusive rights to produce" something others may wish to
produce.
The transfers most affected by patent restrictions are those
that protect new processes not yet widely diffused. In fact, one
of the functions of the patent process is to reduce the rate of
diffusion of a new idea throughout the market. When a new idea
or manufacturing process is absorbed at too fast a rate in its
respective industry, the rate of return to the innovating firm of
the firm's research investment is diminished accordingly. This
condition has prompted a U.S. government official to remark that
"the patent system institutionalizes the relationship between tech-
nology generation and diffusion." 3 0
The international system for protecting industrial property
is reflected in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property (1975). This agreement provides for the "national
treatment and right of priority for owners of patents and trade-
marks."31 Developing country signatories to the Convention have
sought to revise the rules in order to gain easier access to
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patented technology. Many LDCs view patent protections as closely
linked to trade opportunities since new manufactured products
may depend on patent rights for export. Unless the rights to a
process are secured without incumbrances, the product could be
effectively barred from international markets.
Protection of patents overseas has been a matter of official
concern. The authority granted the Commerce Department in Section
337 of the 1974 Trade Act, permits the U.S. government to exclude
imports of manufactures produced under infringed or stolen tech-
nology. Sanctions on violators of the- code are authorized in
Section 301 of the Act. Prosecution under the existing codes is
difficult to pursue; when infringements are discovered, each is
decided on a case-by-case basis . . . provided a private party
initiates a complaint.
ISTC's function in providing access to patented technology is
not fully discussed in the proposal. Should issues associated with
negotiation over patents become a constraint to the transfer
process, they will have to be resolved at that time considering
prevailing circumstances. Suffice it to say that patents and trade-
marks will play a restrictive role in future bilateral agreements
on technology cooperation.
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3.3 SUMMARY
From a description of the issues surrounding cooperation in
transferring scientific and technological information and know-how,
targeting decisions can be made for conveying the right skills,
techniques and ideas, based on informed judgments.
The distinction drawn between science and technology permits
practical applications to be pursued by ISTC management. It also
enables the planner to design an organizational structure that is
responsive to the people and the tasks involved. Appropriate
technology that employs more labor and less capital is preferred
from a developmental point of view, but may not be politically
pertinent.
Cooperative links have suffered from neglect. ISTC manage-
ment and staff have a responsibility to address this issue by
fostering cooperative and collaborative grass-roots ties with the
scientific and technological communities in developing countries.
The need to establish a more equitable and stable relationship
among developing and developed countries can be met by strengthening
the lagging capacity in fields of basic and applied research,
especially in the social sciences.
The optimal organizational structure for enhancing the tech-
nology transfer process is one that features a supportive environment
for cooperation. A place for the critical role of "technology
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gatekeepers" must be found in such structures. Sensitivity to the
psychodynamics of the processes that encourage cooperative ties
will insure harmonious planning and improved coordination among
the public and private agencies involved in the ISTC program.
Management of the issues which surround enlisting cooperation,
transferring skills and obtaining resources can be done well or
poorly. It is possible to have competent people in technical
positions conducting transfer programs who are unaware of their
inadequacies.
Developing societies have to exercise prudence in selecting
which technology policies will be followed. Several factors are
involved, not the least of which is the cost of change. Available
resources are insufficient in quantity and kind to support
adequately the immediate basic research required to develop tech-
nical capacity in a relatively short time. If time is of the
essence, the patterns of acculturation affected by change need to be
understood by the transferors---ISTC and associated organizations---
in order that innovations will not be buried in the furrows of
resistance. Funding the appropriate technologies and programs must
include various disciplines, for without these investments, the
options for meeting basic human needs and approaching global
problems through scientific and technological research will become
dangerously limited.
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"You can imagine, Watson, with what
eagerness I listened to this extraordinary
sequence of events, and endeavored to
piece them together, and to devise some
common thread upon which they might all
hang."
The Musgrave Ritual
4.0 MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
The extraordinary sequence of events in the evolution of the
U.S. foreign assistance system has made devising a common thread
by which to organize them the continuing problem of Presidential
administrations and Congressional committees. This section does
not review the history of U.S. foreign aid, but focuses instead
on the management of the organizational issues raised by the latest
reorganization of the system. The first subsection presents the
purpose and structure of IDCA and provides an overview of the ISTC
proposal. The second subsection describes the organizational issues
which must be managed in introducing any large system change. These
subsections provide a basis for subsection three, which discusses
the issues peculiar to ISTC, and for subsection four, which presents
the implications of ISTC's special problems. The fifth and final
subsection summarizes the key issues facing the managers of the
proposed reorganization.
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Statement of the Problem
*
The International Development Cooperation Act of 1979
has introduced a major change in the structure of the U.S.
bilateral development assistance system. Under the provisions
of this Act, two new agencies have been authorized: The
International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) and the
Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC).
Also contained in the Act is the intent of the U.S. Congress to
alleviate the worst manifestations of poverty in developing
countries by contributing to their economic and social progress.
Basic human needs policy is made the focus for designing programs
that are to be supported by this Act.
Changes in an institution's policies and programs create
organizational issues which must be managed if the institution's
programs are to be efficiently and effectively implemented. The
Act mandates the creation of new organizations and a focus on
basic human needs, linking the two by direct goal statements.
Central to the discussion of organizational issues is the impact
basic human needs policy and scientific and technological
cooperation/transfer issues might have on the organizational
structure of ISTC and visa versa. For example, one of the most
significant issues may be the resistance to change experienced
by the people working in the system.
Using ISTC as a focus, then, this section looks at its
Public Law 96-53, 22 USC 2151.
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proposed purposes, goals, and structure to identify the possible
issues that could affect the implementation of the ISTC plan.
The expectation that the new Institute will take a leadership
role in promoting technology both on a world-wide basis and
within the U.S. development assistance system makes it even
more important that the implications of these changes be understood.
In an attempt to trace the common thread upon which problems
olf implementation may hang, this section describes the proposed
reorganization and the organizational issues which are likely
to be involved. The issues are described in terms of the following
characteristics and variables: the organization's dynamics and
processes; the inferred change process for ISTC; the need for
managing the transitional phase of ISTC and the reasons for using
a planned change strategy as a means to overcome resistance to
the introduction of new policies, programs, and structures.
4.1 REORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SYSTEM
Reorganization Plan No. 2 transmitted to the Congress in
April 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, is the Executive response
specifying the structure of IDCA. The purpose of IDCA is to
coordinate U.S. economic policies and programs affecting developing
nations. Under this plan, policy-making authority will be more
directly a Presidential responsibility than a task diffused
throughout the various Cabinet Departments,2 thereby improving
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the efficiency of decisions about foreign development. Similarly,
ISTC was created to complement the activities of IDCA. Since both
IDCA and ISTC represent major changes in the present organization
of U.S. bilateral development assistance, they become the focus
for the study of planned change in this area. A description of the
organizational plans follows.
Purpose and Structure of IDCA
IDCA has the primary responsibility for coordination of
activities related to international development and funded by
the U.S. government. Its purposes are to "provide stronger direc-
tion of U.S. policies toward the developing world, ensure a more
coherent development strategy, promote the more effective use of
the various bilateral instruments by which the U.S. can encourage
economic and social progress in developing countries, and ensure
that U.S. bilateral programs and the multinational programs to
which we contribute better complement each other."3
The IDCA Director is designated as the principal interna-
tional development advisor to the President and the Secretary of
State. The Director chairs the Development Coordination Committee
(DCC), recommends the appointment and tenure of senior officials
of IDCA components, and controls budgets and policies of AID,
ISTC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and
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the PL 480 Program. The Director is also responsible for the
achievement of consistency and balance among the policies, major
programs, and budgets of component agencies.
The Carter message further delineates the following respon-
sibilities for the IDCA Director:
The IDCA Director would be responsible for ensuring
that development goals are taken fully into account in
all executive branch decision-making on trade, technology
and other economic policy issues affecting the less
developed nations, and would submit an annual development
policy statement to the Congress. The Director would
also prepare a comprehensive foreign assistance budget,
which he would submit to the Office of Management and
Budget after consulting with the Secretary of State, and
would lead the Administr tion's presentation of that
budget to the Congress.
In general, many functions formerly served by the AID
Administrator are now assumed by the IDCA Director. For example,
the AID Administrator is now a level III position, the IDCA
Director is level II. This shift in responsibilities is illus-
trated in the following organization charts. Chart 4.1 diagrams
the structure of the Department of State (1978) prior to the
reorganization. Chart 4.2 provides a detail of AID's structure
(February 1979) prior to the reorganization. Chart 4.3 emphasizes
IDCA's linkages to the entire foreign assistance network.
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The ISTC Proposal: overview
In addition to the shifts in responsibility resulting from
IDCA's creation, the ISTC would cause further changes in the
foreign assistance structure, particularly in the AID. As
described in the February 23, 1979 Congressional Presentation,
the Institute has a dual purpose: "(1) To strengthen capacities
of developing countries seeking to apply science and technology
to meet their needs; (2) To focus increased scientific and tech-
nological research attention on the search for better ways to
meet basic human needs and approach global problems."5
In specific, ISTC would be directed toward the following
activities:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Increasing agricultural productivity and income.
Improving health conditions in developing areas.
Improving population programs.
Improving nutritional levels in developing countries.
Strengthening indigenous science and technology
capacity.
(6) Improving processes of technological cooperation.
(7) Providing communications and information systems.
(8) Encouraging energy planning and finding new energy
supplies.
(9) Promoting environmental protection and supporting
natural resource management.
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(10) Creating non-agricultural employment.
The structure proposed for carrying out these and other
functions of the Institute calls for a centralized Director
and a number of decentralized offices. The Director, appointed
by the President, heads ten Problem Area Offices (corresponding
to the program initiatives listed above) led by coordinators who
are supported by small staffs and a variable number of scientific
and technical specialists. Each Problem Area Office administers
grants and contracts in support of its share of Institute programs.
In addition, the Institute maintains regional field offices over-
seas staffed by an ISTC representative, a deputy, local support
staff, and specialists assigned on long or short term basis
depending on specific project activities. (See Chart 4.4).
Both its activities and its structure give the Institute
characteristics which distinguish it sharply from other U.S.
development cooperation programs. In particular, it is unique
in the following regards: its focus on the research and develop-
ment function; direct involvement of experts from developing
countries; sustained attention to development problems by the
science and technology community; its focus on problems rather
than on countries, including cooperative work with the "middle
tier countries"; and its attention to programs which attack
poverty and to newer elements of developmental concern which
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basic operating
units touftc1 zCV " so
Chart 4.4
'-4
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impinge upon U.S. economic and social interest; and finally, its
operating style supportive of direct institute-to-institute contacts
and collaboration.
Personnel
Chart 4.4, derived from the written description of the
Institute's personnel and functional requirements, describes
the likely personnel structure of ISTC. The personnel system
will be managed internally and patterned after the career service
of the bilateral aid program. Thus, scientific and technological
personnel will be non-career specialists designated as Institute
Fellows, with one-fourth to one-third from developing countries.
Specialists will be assigned to problem areas and also function
from time to time as a multi-disciplinary body of experts.
In addition, an advisory council of up to twenty-five
persons appointed by the President (one third from developing
countries) will advise the Director and senior staff (Program
Coordinators) at least four times a year on matters involving
broad policy or program change. Review panels will be drawn from
lists of qualified scientists and technologists who are knowledge-
able about the specific problem areas or requirements of developing
countries. They will conduct periodic external reviews of the
technical aspects of research and program proposals. The Institute's
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relationships with other agencies will be maintained through
an as yet undefined subcommittee structure.
Special Concerns
The Congressional Presentation singles out special concerns
involved in separating ISTC from AID. Some of these concerns
are related to the issues of organizational change addressed in
this paper: "To be done well, the IFCT (ISTC) assignment calls
for a different personnel, a larger time frame, a different
programming process, and an alternate system of evaluation, and
a set of relationships quite different from those of AID." 6
These special concerns are offered as justification for an
institute separate from AID. Immediate problems, it is argued,
absorb the time of AID technical experts and limit the number
of qualified personnel available to carry out the "New Directions."
Also the number of technical experts in AID is declining.
Therefore, it is necessary to draw ISTC's personnel from the
scientific and technological communities. Though research and
development calls for long term efforts and flexibility, AID's
programming cycle is short term and considered by ISTC planners
as cumbersome to change. Hence, there is a need for ISTC to
use a multi-year time frame for programming and to be flexible
enough to change direction rapidly.
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The proposal also suggests that ISTC fill the need for more
appropriate evaluation systems and for relationships or linkages
abroad which are conducted more with individuals and private and
public institutions and less with governments. The presentation
also stresses that the Institute should work particularly actively
with institutions devoted to meeting basic human needs.
In general, the Institute is said to offer a "productive
balance of relevance and independence . . . broadened applications
beyond the confines of AID . . ., involvement of science and
technology communities . . . a new collaborative approach
(especially with middle tier countries) . . . an emphasis on both
basic human needs and problems of global maintenance . . ., an
appropriate operating style (i.e., evaluation and operating
procedures specific to its mission) . . . private sector involvement
. . . a response to the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology
for Development . . . an added dimension to domestic R&D . . .
and an added perspective on foreign policy." 8
The foregoing discussion centered on the set of variables
affecting the mission and structure of ISTC -- basic human need
policy, technology cooperation and Reorganization Plan No. 2.
The above list of possible advantages to be gained from the
creation of ISTC offers some insight into the organizational
design problems AID or the new Institute would face in introducing
the accompanying changes. In the next sections, issues in
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organizational design are summarized and ISTC is seen in light of
these concerns.
4.2 ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES: THEORETICAL PREMISES
Organizations undergoing change face problems common to
many large social systems where change alters ongoing behavioral
patterns. ISTC clearly falls in this category. Change problems
have been empirically studied to determine the components that
are most affected (e.g., Kelman, 1978). Those components of
a social program which are likely to face conflict when organi-
zational change is attempted typically include the following:
(1) The goals to which the change activities are directed.
(2) The target groups of change.
(3) The strategies used to implement the intervention.
(4) The evaluation of the consequences of the intervention.
Deliberate social interventions in an organization are
likely to create tensions within the groups affected by the
factors outlined above. Conflict can arise, for example, when
non-affected top management (Congressional planners, consultants
and other agents not directly affected by the change) prescribe
the reorganization of tasks and social arrangements.9 Individuals
and groups can resist the change effort no matter how well
conceived the plan may be, and resistance becomes a signal
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that something is wrong in the process.
Trying to overcome resistance directly does little to alter
10the conditions which produced it in the first place. Social arrange-
ments which remain unattended within the organization can work
against the mission. These conditions and arrangements must be
understood and their impact on the tasks assessed before attempting
to implement the reorganization plan.
Thus, knowing where the potential areas of trouble are
and whose values are affected aids in preparing a strategy to
deal with objections to the change. Lawrence (1954) has suggested
that resistance is often needless. What is necessary is to
better understand the "true nature of the resistance" being observed.
What values are being breached and what ethical questions are being
challenged by the change effort? The unconscious behavioral
and motivational responses to environmental influences, i.e.,
the psychodynamics, play a key role in affecting a group's ability
to work toward a desired goal.
The conflicts arising from goal changes affecting personnel
groups and the concommitant conflicts over implementation strat-
egies and the evaluation of the consequences of change in an
organization are most often manifest in an organization's
operational considerations. Some of the variables and character-
istics that we can expect to be affected are as follows:
- 85 -
(1) The clarity with which roles are established.
(2) The decision making process.
(3) The information and communication flow.
(4) The operational procedures and norms.
(5) The problem solving process.
Although the organizational issues raised by the proposed
structure and mission of ISTC affect the dynamics and processes
of the primary organization, in this case the IDCA system, the
Institute plan is the focus of discussion in the hope of identi-
fying the areas where implementation may be difficult. In
specific, the next subsection discusses the clarity of goals
and consequent effect on the operational consideration of role
definition, decision-making processes, information and communica-
tion flow, operational procedures and problem-solving within the
ISTC.
4.3 ISSUES PECULIAR TO ISTC
Clarity of Goals
The goals toward which the ISTC activities are directed
grow from the assumptions which accompanied the recommendations
10a
to reorganize the AID system and create ISTC as a separate entity.
The underlying assumptions are:
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(1) That basic human needs policy would be the principal
focus of interest in the Congress for the next 3-5 years.
(1980-1984).
(2) That basic human needs will continue to be an area of
special competence for the AID - ISTC programs on a world-wide
basis.
(3) That AID would not be the source of high-end technology
in the future and therefore a new agency (ISTC) would have to
provide the framework for channeling technological resources to the
developing world.
(4) That the conflict between the generalists and the
specialists in AID detracts from pursuing New Directions approaches,
which include BHN policy. Basic needs programming is considered
the specialization of AID's staff.
(5) That ISTC is considered a likely agency which can
assume the technological leadership for future foreign aid programs.
(6) That, despite the demand for scientific and techno-
logical expertise focused on development problems, no increase in
staff is contemplated for AID despite an increase in funding levels
by a factor of two.10b
One conclusion that may be drawn is that a failure to
recognize the importance of these assumptions which undergird the
goals of ISTC could result in failure to meet the desired goals.
This point is raised because the current delay in obtaining an
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appropriation may hinge on the assumptions that some Congressional
leaders may have about ISTC. For example, they may have strong
conceptions about its future role in foreign affairs, or in the
focus of U.S. development assistance. Since the goals are based
on these assumptions, the intervention strategy must be designed
so as to recognize these implicit and explicit assumptions.
The principal goals ISTC will pursue in its change strategies
are as follows:
-- Maintain a program distinguished from that of AID and
the Development Support Bureau characterized by a 'distinct
method of operations basic to its (ISTC's) purpose.'
-- Bring together multi-disciplinary attention to bear
on complex development problems so as to broaden the view of the
development task.
-- Involve the view and talents of developing country
experts in the quest for solutions and alternative methods with
which to address development bottlenecks.
-- Create a working environment that is attractive, stimu-
lating and able to retain the necessary scientific and technological
talent critical to ISTC's programs.
-- Focus the staff attention directly on problem solving
activities, thereby reinforcing the orientation toward the mission
and tasks on ISTC's agenda.
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The goals expressed in official public documents, paraphrased
above, are not specifically responsive to the special requirements
of either basic human needs policies or to the issues raised by
technology transfer, discussed in Sections 2.0 and 3.0 of this
paper. Moreover, the official (formal) description does not
propose an organizational format for implementing these goals. The
only hint is contained in the recommendation which suggests that
ISTC rely on the "bilateral aid program" for its career service
and internal management system.12 Though the plan suggests that
"structure and processes" will reflect these goals, no mention is
made of how it will be done.13
The general tenor of the goal statement lends itself to
varying interpretations. There is some ambiguity about the steps
needed to achieve, through organizational protocols, an efficient
Institute, making prudent use of its resources. With respect to
BHN objectives, such as participation of those affected by the
change, the goal of involving the views of LDC experts can be
interpreted as an effort at broad-based participation in making
decisions within ISTC. However, in federal bureaucracies, whatever
is not specified can be easily overlooked. More importantly,
lack of specificity about implementing and measuring results
makes these steps unreliable at best.
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Clarity of Roles
A factor which contributes to the effectiveness of an organi-
zation is that those who perform the different tasks understand their
roles -- what their assignment is, both in terms of their interests
and in terms of the expectations of Congressional leaders, the
Administration and developing country institutions.
Organizational theories hold that roles are considered key
determinants in evaluating functions performed by persons and
sub-units. Roles are shaped by expectations based on performance
of tasks. (Beckhard, 1972; Kotter et. al. Ch. 7). In ISTC's
case, for example, the expectations of problem area offices will
vary, depending on the disciplines of specialists and fellows
working on a problem. Whenever roles are not clearly defined,
the likelihood of conflicts arising is greater, and role conflicts
are certain to develop into issues, especially in the multi-
disciplinary environment proposed, where expectations from the
larger universe of ISTC's clients are at play, there is a ripe
medium for problems to develop. Individuals and offices will
be faced with time constraints that limit the number of tasks
that can be performed with care. The priorities selected reflect
the focus of policy thrusts which, in turn, determine the kinds
of roles needed.
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Conflicts can be reduced when expectations are in line with
commitments and are based on established criteria for selecting
task priorities. Attention should center on how personnel perform
their work, despite conflicts that may emerge as a result of LDC
national development agendas and U.S. foreign policy expectations.
Since implementation will be dependent upon the abilities and
competences of individuals selected to manage programs, the
roles for each position need to be agreed upon. The classification
should allow enough flexibility to accommodate program uncertainty.
Yet, there is no mention of how to address organizational
issue in the planning documents. The significance of maintaining
clarity about roles is that without resolution it affects the
efficiency of operations. Role clarification is further compli-
cated by uncertain job assignments which cannot be worked out
until ISTC becomes operational and problems are identified. It
is also true that technicians and administrators responsible for
introducing and maintaining organizational changes are usually
not skilled or knowledgeable about managing the special roles
involved in a multicultural, multi-disciplinary work environment.*
*
There is little verifiable data to support the assumption that
expertise in managing change exists within the IDCA system; one
can infer from discussions, interviews and official documents that the
special skills and knowledge needed to manage the change, as framed
in the context of this paper, are not appropriately placed. Some of
the people more sensitive to development problems and capable of
understanding change process are in offices with lesser influence
on the overall system. The staff in the Office of Personnel
Management (PM/TD) have a critical responsibility for setting
standards, criteria for developing the kind of staff skills neces-
sary. The spillover effect is negligible at the present.
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Clearly it would be ideal if ISTC could produce role descrip-
tions which reflect practical work situations; they contribute
to job enrichment and job enlargement. Jobs that are defined in
this way and openly structured attract the kind of professional
talent ISTC hopes to retain. Thus, they would tend to make the
total organizational effort more consonant with development require-
ments.
Decision Making Process
Closely related to the issue of role clarity is the issue
of how well ISTC's decision making apparatus works. In complex
organizations, the trend is to locate decision making authority
as close to the source of the problem as possible. The optimal
condition would be to place the power to influence decisions on
the people having the most appropriate information on the problem,
irrespective of their role or status within the ISTC operations
and management level.
A question that needs to be answered is where does the
information for decisions lie? In programmatic cases, ISTC will
need to rely on the documentation retained in DSB about past
enterprises undertaken by AID. Crossing organizational boundaries
in search of vital information, however, may cause a loss of
ISTC's effectiveness in becoming the source of technology leader-
ship. Decisions based on borrowed information run the risk of
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being incomplete. For this reason, the decision making process,
especially on the operational level, has to be developed so that
decisions made in the new agency and its "parents" are based on
mutual trust and freely exchanged.
In addition to being based on better information, decisions
affecting the types of programs and the levels of support for
LDC institutions can be more complete when the process for arriving
at decisions includes those people closer to the problem. (Usually
these are the same people who can contribute the relevant infor-
mation). Management studies have shown that people are likely
to support those decisions they have helped to make. A feeling of
"ownership" for the decisions is critical in achieving an effective
14
implementation of the contemplated change. By inference, then,
AID officials and ISTC staff at different levels of the hierarchy
have to be involved in the change process.
Unfortunately, this level of full participation is not possi-
ble in the organization as currently designed. First, LDC counter-
parts have no discernible role in the current decision making process.
Second, it is not clear whether or not ISTC will have the choice in
selecting countries served or problems addressed. It is reasonable
to expect Congressional pressure favoring certain countries over
others or in pursuing a research proposal suggested by the Adminis-
tration. But it is only with an enlightened, open decision making
process that these conflicts can be satisfactorily resolved and
inconsistencies accepted.
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Information Flow and Communication
Effectiveness in ISTC will depend upon the kind of information
it has available and the quality of communication transmitted.
Distrust among working groups can be aggravated when pertinent
data is truncated by a process of clearances and approvals. These
procedures tend to limit the rate of information flow reaching
decision centers.
In ISTC, problem area offices (see Chart 4.4) are charged with
*
coordinating the problem selection cycle among several groups
in a community setting by a problem area team. Confidence building
in a team, however, requires pertinent, complete information in
order to counteract client distrust that may arise as an outcome
of the change. More generally, it becomes a matter of critical
importance for the success of the implementation of ISTC's policies
and programs to have access to sound information about what and
why some members do what they do. Frequent communication, together
with more information on strategies, data, intended results, and
constraints are needed to set the collaborative style in motion.
Ways are needed to increase trust and openness in a system tradi-
tionally known for clustering critical policy information on only
a few staffers. What is important is that those who have access to
*
The problem selection cycle would include the manner in which
problems are identified, by whom, under what criteria and for what
purpose are they accepted for attention and possible funding. Also
the evaluation of programs becomes part of the cycle.
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policy information, but are not close to the problems, not be given
all the power over decisions. (e.g., As is often the case, the
U.S. staff has the dominant position in a bilateral program).
The expectation of the Planning Office is that a multi-
disciplinary, cross cultural approach will evolve under ISTC's
guidance. The collaborative style of operation calls for communi-
cating different value systems, norms and desires, together with
the program content. ISTC coordinators must have in-depth knowledge
about the effects of BHN policy on development strategies and the
reasons behind the New International Economic Order.
Examining the social aspects of organizational issues and
institutional organization patterns is an effective approach
towards satisfying communication and information needs. 14 a
Management information systems, evaluation research and applied
behavioral sciences can complement the existing knowledge that
could be pressed into service to assure broader and more complete
information sharing in ISTC. Communications technology can also
be employed to augment the quantity and frequency of information
and possibly help to counteract client distrust over the intentions
of the change effort underway. It should be pointed out, however,
that these technologies are not enough to overcome all the impedi-
ments that established or inherited norms and procedures pose
for ISTC. Bureaucratic intrangency dampen efforts at improving
communication in the IDCA setting, irrespective of technological
marvels.
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Operational Procedures and Norms
Operational procedures are those steps or requirements for
task accomplishment which are specified in writing. Most large
organizations have manuals specifying the procedures for various
aspects of the organization's operation. AID is no exception.
Indeed, its many procedural manuals are sometimes regarded as one
of the chief reasons for project delay. Norms, on the other hand,
are those unwritten practices that control the behavior and inter-
actions of daily operations. Operational norms can range from the
subtleties of who sends and who receives memos and in what order
to reward and promote systems based on old-boy relationships.
ISTC has been structured, a priori to depend on the organi-
zation of AID for program support overseas. AID administrative
procedures are to be adopted in areas of personnel management and
budget control.15 Under these conditions, it is reasonable to
expect that many norms and the general operating style of AID
will also carry over into ISTC. Also, ISTC will not have control
over the AID field staff when implementing its own policies. Thus,
until a new division of labor is accepted among the AID work
groups, ISTC will have to risk losing program control to the
AID.
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A particular concern expressed by ISTC planners16 is the
desirability to maintain control over the contracting process
for goods and services. The Contracts Office of AID has been
described as overburdened with legalistic procedures imposed by
federal guidelines -- in addition to the fact that its norms and
demands are peculiar to AID. A separate contracting function
for ISTC could be a practical solution to the alternative of
depending on AID for this task. The issues raised by general
adherence to the procedures, however, remain, and there is
danger that such close linkage to AID may vitiate ISTC's collab-
orative, quick-to-act style.
Problem Solving Process
How will ISTC resolve problems within its institutional bound-
ary and who will solve them? Whenever people with different
professional backgrounds and nationalities are brought together as
peers in a common work environment, tensions are certain to appear.17
Unsatisfactory solutions to such task related problems can erode
confidence in management's ability to conduct a collaborative style
of operations.
Processes must be devised, then, for managing new interfaces,
such as non-U.S. scientists interfacing with the DSB divisional
chiefs who previously controlled AID's research resources. The
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traditional practice has been to minimize or discount the role of
LDC technicians in a problem situation dominated by U.S. staff.
The reasons given for this disparate treatment of views among
nationalities are that security and classification regulations
purposely restrict the input of non-citizens in policy decisions.
Problem solving approaches will have to disregard administrative
constraints such as these or risk losing the active participation
of non-U.S. staff.
Managing the Transition
The preceding description of organizational issues in ISTC,
based on the experience of AID, described some of ISTC's probable
internal dynamics and processes. In addition to concerns about
ISTC's organizational design, issues about the change process itself
are important to its success. How does ISTC's management implement
the legislated changes in structure, policy and program focus?
What are the steps that can be taken? For a model against which
to weigh alternatives, one might look at the experience of similar
institutions in similar circumstances. Applied behavioral scientists
who examine organizational behavior in large, complex systems
provide empirical results of observations from which projections
can be made. Recent studies of the North American health organi-
zations by Beckhard (1977, 1972), Tichy (1976), and others, as
well as research in the private sector, by Lorsch (1976),
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Weisbord (1974), Seeger, J., Lorsch, J. Gibson, C., (1979), and
Kotter (1979), suggest the types of variables usually operating
in a major change effort.
Contingency theories of organizational design attempt to
define components and processes which contribute to finding a
proper fit among people, technology and structure.18 Seen in
this perspective, ISTC's effectiveness depends on how well the
structures of sub-units, their leadership style, and planning
and control systems are matched to its mission. Thus, getting
started means planning for the transition that occurs between
the present situation and the desired end state four years hence.
The transition is an unique condition, limited by time and bound
by the special circumstances affecting the dynamics and processes
described above.
In addition, the transition stage is characterized by a high
degree of uncertainty and instability in the organization. Members
perceive inconsistencies which, if unchecked, can produce high
levels of emotional stress. Control over the situation becomes
paramount since principal leaders become especially visible to the
constituency. Consequently, expectations are raised about the
trust, respect and competency of these leaders.
Thus, management must demonstrate confidence in the change
plans since members of ISTC and its constituents need to perceive
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the strategies employed as consistent with ISTC's goals.19 An
effective transition management can also serve the function of
providing feedback for evaluating performance against goals and
make the necessary readjustments as the process develops. In
general, the level of commitment from key supporters during the
transition stage plays a significant part in determining the
achievement of the future desired state.
Though a plan for managing the transition is an essential
tool for implementing the contemplated changes, the transition
plan for ISTC is unclear -- at least as judged from the presenta-
tion to the Congressional committees. The plan should identify
who makes up the transition management team of ISTC and identify
the tasks in clear, specific terms. Members of ISTC's basic
operating units will be looking for consistency with the change
goals in the priorities selected by management. In theory, all
discreet activities should be integrated with explicit time
sequences spelled out in the plan. Contingency plans for meeting
the uncertainty of future conditions should be agreed to by IDCA.
As a final step, the plan should show the cost effectiveness of
all investment activities in terms of time, resources and people.
A special structure will be necessary for ISTC to manage day-to-day
operations during the transition period. This structure will need
to include chief managers, representatives from various constituen-
cies, relevant sub-systems, the IDCA hierarchy and all problem
area coordinators.
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4.4 Implications of Special Problems
The organizational issues described above represent the key
situational variables involved in ISTC's change effort -- its
creation. In determining the best way to approach the reorganization
task, management will make implicit and explicit choices regarding
the time allotted for the change to take place, the kind of
preplanning needed, the involvement of others and the attention
focused on alternatives. Depending on the speed with which change
is desired, the tactics employed will vary from slow, initially
unplanned activities involving many members to rapid, clearly
planned, non-participatory approaches primarily aimed at overcoming
resistance.
The choice of strategy for implementing the ISTC will depend
on the level and type of resistance anticipated. Overcoming
resistance can prove a difficult task if the level is found to be
high. The recommended approach is one in which change is slowly
introduced, so as to allow more members to participate, and an
attempt is made to minimize resistance. The choice seems desirable
for two reasons. First, a major reason that people resist
organizational change is that they believe they will lose something
of personal value as a result. Their responses are then directed
more toward protecting their personal agendas than the organization's
best interests.20
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Second, overcoming the fear change generally produces
also implies using a strategy that can deal with personal stress,
loss of self esteem and sense of worth. After all, some staff
members will stand to gain a desired position, while others will,
in fact, lose. This is especially difficult because, as
Peter Drucker has argued, the greatest impediment to organization
growth is the "manager's inability to change" employees' attitude
and behavior.
Another aspect to consider in thinking about the imple-
mentation of ISTC is the status of the Planning Office with.respect
to the rest of the IDCA system. It was noted earlier that ISTC's
budget and staff is much smaller than the institutions it is
trying to impact. Furthermore, ISTC depends on DSB for program
information. Obtaining the cooperation and commitment of DSB
and other units in AID to implement the change requires time and
broader participation. These factors present problems because,
if those responsible for initiating and implementing the change
in ISTC have little or no power to control actions, the change
will proceed slowly.
Finally, there is the matter of risk. Will organizational
performance be risked by the choice of change strategy selected?
If long term results are preferred over short run accomplishments,
then one can expect a slower change effort, since a collaborative
style absorbs more time at the onset. It may well be a few years
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before ISTC becomes a viable entity, but the necessity for a
viable transition strategy is clear. Already AID managers are
expressing doubts about the feasibility of ever making the new
organization operational, questioning the functions of newly
created staff positions , and in general evidencing the resistance
to change described above.
Organizational Structure
In Section 3.0, the organizational structure for ISTC was
described, based on the special characteristics of technology
transfer. The functions of the technological gatekeeper, however,
require an environment radically different from the conventional
institutional forms proposed. A plausible alternative is to
*
adopt the matrix form of management together with a team approach,
given the kinds of tasks and interfaces expected of ISTC.
*
The identifying feature of a matrix organization is that some
managers report to two rather than one boss -- there is a dual
rather than a single chain of command.
Firms adopt a matrix form when it is absolutely essential that
they be responsible to two sectors, such as basic research and tech-
nology,when they face uncertainties that generate very high information
processing requirements; and when they must deal with strong con-
straints on financial and/or human resources. The matrix form can
help provide flexibility and balanced decision making, but at the price
of complexity. Matrix organization is more than structure, it must be
reinforced by matrix systems such as dual control and evaluation
systems, by matrix leadership behavior that operates comfortably
with lateral decision making and by a matrix culture that fosters
open conflict management and a balance of power.
Every matrix organization contains three unique and critical
roles: the top manager who heads up and balances the dual chains
of command; the matrix bosses (functional, product or area) who share
subordinates; and the two boss managers who report to two different
matrix bosses. Each of these roles has its own unique requirements.
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A matrix management form will require, in addition to other
changes in procedure, a reward system distinct from the conventional
AID system. Since the organizational values involved in a matrix
form of organization are different from a more conventional form,
the prevailing practices will need to be reconsidered.
An important issue arises from the Administration's and
Congress's commitment to LDCs and ISTC's emphasis on both basic
human needs and problems of global maintenance. Problems of global
maintenance face developed as well as less-developed countries,
but there are no clear guidelines for selecting problems. Defi-
nition of the specific BHN problems to be addressed will require
selection of geographical problem areas and recognition of culture's
role in development problems will require country or culture-
specific selection of problems. The regional area concept proposed
in ISTC documents suggests a much broader attack on problem
solving, permitting selection of general problems of global
maintenance, but making consideration of country-specific problems
more difficult.
In addition, budget cuts in federal spending are already
part of the new set of uncertain conditions affecting ISTC's
implementation, and will restrict the number of new endeavors
pursued. For reasons of efficiency, a few well-planned showcase
projects could better serve as a demonstration of the usefulness
of the basic needs approach to development problems. Staff
- 104 -
morale and ISTC's credibility among clients can be improved by
successful and limited projects, assuming ISTC is not previously
committed to a large number of requests politically inspired.
4.5 SUMMARY
This section presented the assumptions behind the goals of
the proposed reorganization of the U.S. bilateral development
assistance system and the reasons for creating the Institute for
Scientific and Technological Cooperation. The necessary changes
in goal, policy and program content impose unique demands on the
Institue. Internally, ISTC must wedge into an environment hostile
to the new Institute. Outwardly, the Institute must respond to
development agendas which may or may not be consistent with ISTC
programs and philosophy. Cooperation under circumstances of
uncertainty and waning credibility for U.S. assistance may come
difficult to obtain, despite the need for technology.
Basic human needs policies and technology cooperation also
pose unique organizational demands on ISTC. The creation of ISTC
in the wake of a major reorganization of a large, complex system
of which ISTC is a sub-unit, compounds the issues which affect
its implementation. Over the past year, international events in
developing countries accentuated the need for a broader understanding
of the effects rapid technological change can produce in traditional
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societies. Perceptions among development technicians about
their mission and the manner in which change impacts social sys-
tems must be broadened.
Specifically, organizational issues in ISTC have been des-
cribed in terms of the social dynamics and processes that have
characterized the AID system. Particular problems are the way
decisions are made and by whom; the clarity of individual tasks
and roles; the style of communication, either open or closed; the
information flow within the system; and the way problems are
identified and solved. In addition, managing the transition --
more appropriately, ISTC's metamorphosis -- is perhaps the single
most important task for ISTC. Getting from the present state to
the desired end condition requires an interim management structure
able to deal with resistance and ambiguity.
The Administration's effectiveness in conducting foreign
policy changes may well be judged by the success of this seemingly
innocuous event. Indeed, the style of conducting cooperative
enterprises for mutual benefit is a reflection of the depth of
understanding an Administration has about the dynamics and processes
that impede or accelerate change. The microcosm of ISTC may
measure a government's sincerity and appreciation of human systems
and the spirit in which change is introduced.
The process of managing organizational change is, of course,
complex and replete with pitfalls. First, in implementing the
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necessary changes, management may fail to break from traditional
operational orientation. Second, ISTC cannot rush through the
planning process in order to reach the implementation stage without
first considering the tensions produced by Congressional demands
for realizable solutions in the short run. Long term programs
often end in failure, too, as a result of not understanding
what the "process of intervention change involves"22 in a large,
complex system. Recognition of the developmental and inter-
dependent nature of change helps management understand and appre-
ciate the difficulties of organizational interventions..
Whatever intervention strategy ISTC chooses to follow, a fresh
look at the options available for creative applications of
managerial tools is in its advantage. A matrix form of managing
could well serve the special needs of ISTC and an educational
intervention could help leaders relearn the new techniques required
of their new tasks. Those involved in managing change in the IDCA
network, particularly top management and policy makers whose
responsibilities extend into future generations, will need to
examine the concepts presented in this paper. Their contribution
in making ISTC operational depends on understanding the organiza-
tional issues involved and the conditions required for organizational
effectiveness as well as efficiency.
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5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Administration's emphasis on an Institute capable of
fulfilling Congressional mandates and the expectations raised when
President Carter announced the creation of ISTC in Caracas in February
1978, indicate that the time is ripe for initiating a significant
departure from traditional approaches in U.S. relations with the
developing nations.
What this paper has tried to address is the problem of
implementing change in the form and content of development assistance
programs. It was necessary to understand first the parameters
defined by the basic human needs policy and technology transfer
mandates. Second, it was necessary to examine the management strategy
which can ultimately address the new development problems surrounding
U.S. bilateral development assistance.
Understanding the types of changes required for the effective
sharing of scientific and technological expertise involves a prior
assessment of perceptions among the ISTC constituency, the behavior
patterns of the staff, the meaning of policies and procedures which
guide the implementation process.
Implementing policy and program changes in the U.S. bilateral
development assistance system is a complex process. There are many
polarized positions that must be overcome or dealt with before a
successful change effort can take root. For example, what is the
the operating perception of the staff with respect to basic human
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needs programming? Is it regarded as merely another Congressional
gimmick devoid of practical substance? An assessment of this
perception is indispensable. Such an assessment should include a
coneensus about the definition of the problems faced in implementing
BHN projects. A pertinent question is what is going to change --
the relationships with AID and DSB: the program content, or the
relationships with institutions in developing countries? And
finally, what will be the desired end-state when ISTC becomes
operational?
The willingness of key individuals within the IDCA system,
particularly AID, to allow the changes to take effect and to help
the ISTC management through the initial as well as transitional
stages so as to make the necessary changes happen is a critical
factor. Further, the capability to initiate the desired change is
dependent upon adequate funding levels, human resources and commitment.
Unless there exists a critical mass of top people within the
Administration, IDCA and cooperating country institutions supportive of
the ISTC concept, there is little hope that the organizational issues
herein described can be adequately resolved.
A strategy to help key members evaluate the problems -- i.e.,
distinguish between the substantive changes in policy direction from
the organizational issues of marshalling needed resources, must be
made part of the implementation strategy. Enabling managers (decision
makers) to relearn organizational behavior in order to deal with low
levels of trust, organizational games and unilaterally made decisions
is part of the educational strategy recommended. The reasoning behind
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this recommendation is that a cleavage exisits between the knowledge
of development problems raised by diffusion of technology and the
competence within the IDCA system to produce a workable solution
within the context of the international development environment.
Acceptance that conflicts exist, not only with respect to
basic needs policy and technological cooperation issues and constraints,
but in terms of existing coalitions that resist change and recognition
that this resistance must be managed is a determinant first step
toward implementation. As Chrys Argyris (1980) notes, quasi
resolutions to conflict are reinforced by intergroup warfare. The
foreign assistance organization is reputed to be a closed system
where issues of human frailty are undiscussable. ISTC, cut from
the same branch,cannot be expected to be an exception. The final
organizational design mirrors the "theories-in-use" of its members.
A matrix form of management as proposed in Section 4.4 has
merit for the types of programs ISTC is designed to pursue. The
advantage is twofold -- Congressional supporters can be assured that
an effective new agency is at least structurally in the making and
second, the flexibility and accountability for efficiency is made
possible. By adopting an organizational system that is a departure
from traditional forms, which are suspect of bureaucratic dry rot,
enhances the chances for continued support.
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In addition, the flexibility allows for greater participation
of scientists and technologists from developing countries in any of
several projects at different levels of expertise without invoking
the intimidation of rank and status characteristic of existing
institutional forms.
One way to introduce the new management format is through an
intervention strategy (Beckhard, 1977). Initiating a new order of
things is the most dangerous, laborious and threatening exercise for
members of the management staff of ISTC. But if properly conducted,
the intervention could produce excellent results. The resources
exist within IDCA to carry out many of the initial stages for
structuring the new Institute. The use of external consultants
should be discouraged if at all possible. Cost considerations are
but one reasonanother being the psychological factor of a stake
in the ownership of change. The process of change is ongoing and
those responsible must be identified with the process. This factor
is especially relevant during the transition stage when ambiguity
is at its peak.
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